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Re: [Captive-portals] Requirements for "captive portal closed" notifications





On Tue, Mar 20, 2018, 9:56 AM Pierre Pfister <[email protected]> wrote:
Turning the requirements around I would add that sending ICMP messages based on a session being ‘almost done’ might be challenging from a router/hardware perspective. Routers might have to rate-limit such messages, and sometimes fail to send them.


My feeling is just the opposite.. the NAS knows perfectly when it will or will not hold a session captive. If that NAS is being told what to do (e.g. it isn't working on it's own counters, but relying on a radius server), then the radius CoA could just come early with extra parameters (e.g. 'grace period' or even how many and how often to send icmp warnings...)



So I would add that the ICMP message should only be relied upon as a backup mechanism to detect that something is wrong while the API mechanism already failed to detect that the session is almost over.
In other words, I think the detection of a session being almost over is first and foremost a problem to be solved by the API mechanism, and as a backup (i.e. in case of inconsistency between the API and the Enforcement point), with the ICMP mechanism.

- Pierre

Le 20 mars 2018 à 15:29, Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]> a écrit :

Per discussion at the mike today on what we should do with the ICMP unreachable draft - here are some properties I think are necessary in a hint to the UE that the captive portal is closed.

1. The notification should not be easy to spoof. This is easiest to do by making it a hint to the UE that it should talk to the API.
  • An ICMP message by itself is not secure. For example, it's trivial for an off-path attacker to generate ICMP messages for sessions from legitimate UEs to <popularwebsite>:443. Getting a UE to trust such a message only requires getting the ephemeral port right, and many OSes have a quite limited range of ephemeral ports.
  • Tero points out that if we do want to secure such a message, then we should not roll our own security but should use an existing, secure protocol such as IPsec.

2. It should be possible to send the notification *before* the captive portal closes, to facilitate seamless connectivity. Ideally the user should be able to re-up the captive portal without having to wait until the network is dead or the device has switched to another network.

3. The notification should not be on a per-destination basis. A hint that conveys the information "you can reach facebook, but to reach CNN you need to upgrade to another service plan" is not technically infeasible but is unlikely ever to reach WG and IETF consensus and therefore I think we should not spend our time talking about it.

4. I'm not sure whether it's possible for the hint to be anything more than a binary "you are or will very soon be captive". Saying things like "an upgrade opportunity is available" may be hard to encode.

Cheers,
Lorenzo
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