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prefix hijack by ASN 8997
- Subject: prefix hijack by ASN 8997
- From: hank at efes.iucc.ac.il (Hank Nussbacher)
- Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2008 07:32:34 +0300 (IDT)
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
- References: <[email protected]>
On Mon, 22 Sep 2008, Scott Weeks wrote:
I too spotted this via PHAS for a large number of prefixes, but have not
received alerts from IAR, Watchmy.Net nor does RIPE RIS show this hijack:
http://www.ris.ripe.net/perl-risapp/risearch.html I would have expected
with so many RRC boxes that RIPE RIS would have caught it. I had thought
it was a false positive from PHAS but now that you and others have seen it
- I guess it is for real.
-Hank
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>
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> I am hoping to confirm a short-duration prefix hijack of 72.234.0.0/15 (and another of our prefixes) by ASN 8997 ("OJSC North-West Telecom" in Russia) in using ASN 3267 (Russian Federal University Network) to advertise our space to ASN 3277 (Regional University and Scientific Network (RUSNet) of North-Western and Saint-Petersburg Area of Russia).
>
> Is that what I'm seeing when I go to "bgplay.routeviews.org/bgplay", put in prefix 72.234.0.0/15 and select the dates:
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> 22/9/2008 9:00:00 and 22/9/2008 15:00:00
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> If so, am I understanding it correctly if I say ASN 3267 saw a shorter path from ASN 8997, so refused the proper announcement from ASN 36149 (me) it normally hears from ASN 174 (Cogent).
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> If the above two are correct, would it be correct to say only the downstream customers of ASN 3267 were affected?
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> scott
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