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prefix hijack by ASN 8997
- Subject: prefix hijack by ASN 8997
- From: tme at multicasttech.com (Marshall Eubanks)
- Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2008 12:03:54 -0400
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
- References: <[email protected]>
Note that my bgp was through Cogent - my guess is they did filter.
Marshall
On Sep 23, 2008, at 11:54 AM, Scott Weeks wrote:
>
> ------ tme at multicasttech.com wrote: ----------
> From: Marshall Eubanks <tme at multicasttech.com>
>
> So, do you think this was lots of little tests / hijacks / mistakes ?
> Or did it just not propagate very far ?
> ---------------------------------------------
>
> According to Andree Toonk (and someone confirmed privately) ASN 8997
> leaked a full table to ASN 3267 (who didn't filter!). The only
> upstream of ASN 3267 I saw in bgplay was ASN 174 (Cogent) who seems
> to have filtered, but I can't confirm. So I guess that the impact
> would've only been to the peers downstream of ASN 3267.
>
> scott
>
>
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------
> Andree Toonk <andree+nanog at toonk.nl>
>
> Not a false positive, It actually was detected by the RIS box in
> Moscow
> (rrc13). Strange that it's not visible in RIS search website, but it's
> definitely in the raw data files.
> Looking at that raw data from both routeviews and Ripe, it looks like
> they (AS8997) 'leaked' a full table, i.e. :
> ----------------------------------------------
>