NIST IPv6 document

[owen at delong.com (Owen DeLong)]

On Jan 5, 2011, at 7:18 PM, Dobbins, Roland wrote:

> 
> On Jan 6, 2011, at 10:08 AM, Joe Greco wrote:
> 
>> Packing everything densely is an obvious problem with IPv4; we learned early on that having a 48-bit (32 address, 16 port) space to scan made
>> port-scanning easy, attractive, productive, and commonplace.
> 
> I don't believe that host-/port-scanning is as serious a problem as you seem to think it is, nor do I think that trying to somehow prevent host from being host-/port-scanned has any material benefit in terms of security posture, that's our fundamental disagreement.
> 
You are mistaken... Host scanning followed by port sweeps is a very common threat and still widely practiced in IPv4.

> If I've done what's necessary to secure my hosts/applications, host-/port-scanning isn't going to find anything to exploit (overly-aggressive scanning can be a DoS vector, but there are ways to ameliorate that, too).
> 
And there are ways to mitigate ND attacks as well.

> If I haven't done what's necessary to secure my hosts/applications, one way or another, they *will* end up being exploited - and the faux security-by-obscurity offered by sparse addressing won't matter a bit.
> 
Sparse addressing is a win for much more than just rendering scanning useless, but, making scanning useless is still a win.

Owen