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DDoS using port 0 and 53 (DNS)
- Subject: DDoS using port 0 and 53 (DNS)
- From: mysidia at gmail.com (Jimmy Hess)
- Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2012 23:10:52 -0500
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
- References: <[email protected]>
On 7/24/12, Frank Bulk <frnkblk at iname.com> wrote:
> Unfortunately I don't have packet captures of any of the attacks, so I
> can't exam them for more detail, but wondering if there was some collective
> wisdom about blocking port 0.
It should be relatively safe to drop (non-fragment) packets to/from port 0.
If I recall correctly, there are some routers that perform a "helpful"
numeric value validation when the human is entering port numbers for
access list rules, that _do_ forward port 0 traffic, and through
some sort of oversight by the router/firewall vendor actually
_prevent_ the administrator from selecting port 0 in a deny rule, eg.
"Port to deny must be a number from 1 to 65535".
TCP/UDP port 0 is technically a legal port, but it's also a reserved
port, and very unusual for it to be used on the network for any
legitimate purpose. Various firewalls will discard anything TCP/UDP
sent to/from port 0.
Many TCP/UDP sockets implementations won't even let an application
select port 0. bind() to port 0 is treated as a signal that the
application wants the sockets API to pick a high-numbered ephemeral
port.
> Regards,
> Frank
--
-JH