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BCP38 - Internet Death Penalty
- Subject: BCP38 - Internet Death Penalty
- From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu)
- Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2013 11:06:05 -0400
- In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 26 Mar 2013 10:51:45 -0400." <[email protected]>
- References: <[email protected]>
On Tue, 26 Mar 2013 10:51:45 -0400, Jay Ashworth said:
> Do we need to define a flag day, say one year hence, and start making the
> sales pitch to our Corporate Overlords that we need to apply the IDP to
> edge connections which cannot prove they've implemented BCP38 (or at very
> least, the source address spoofing provisions thereof)?
How would one prove this? (In particular, consider the test "have them
download the spoofer code from SAIL and run it" - I'm positive there will
be sites that will put in a /32 block for the test machine so it "fails"
to spoof but leave it open for the rest of the net).
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