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BGP Security Research Question
- Subject: BGP Security Research Question
- From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu)
- Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2014 12:17:21 -0500
- In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 04 Nov 2014 18:02:47 +0700." <[email protected]>
- References: <CAJDTUxOuQeBr2bS0sYJWkZWU7OJLb9+t50Rgccz=ZXx7OfxCGw@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]>
On Tue, 04 Nov 2014 18:02:47 +0700, "Roland Dobbins" said:
> Networks which haven't implemented the BCPs sometimes find their BGP
> peering sessions disrupted via DDoS attacks against the routers
> themselves; SYN-floods and the like against TCP/179 are sometimes used
> to disrupt BGP sessions in such scenarios, for example. Aggressive
> scanning per the above against BGP speakers which haven't implemented
> the BCPs could result in inadvertent disruption of BGP sessions.
Am I the only guy wondering how many boxes out there are *still*
vulnerable to forged RST packets?
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