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DDOS solution recommendation
- Subject: DDOS solution recommendation
- From: nanog at ics-il.net (Mike Hammett)
- Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2015 09:21:13 -0600 (CST)
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
To quote a presentation I heard at a conference regarding small routers, "Buy bigger rooters, bitches." (Yes, I know it isn't that simple, but most of the audience at that conference had purchasing authority.)
Not all networks are doing what they're supposed to be (I'm on that list), but if no one ever does anything because not everyone else is, then nothing ever gets done.
I'm not saying what you're doing is wrong, I'm saying whatever the industry as a whole is doing obviously isn't working and perhaps a different approach is required.
Security teams? My network has me, myself and I.
If for example ChinaNet's abuse department isn't doing anything about complains, eventually their whole network gets blocked a /32 at a time. *shrugs* Their loss.
-----
Mike Hammett
Intelligent Computing Solutions
http://www.ics-il.com
----- Original Message -----
From: "Roland Dobbins" <rdobbins at arbor.net>
To: nanog at nanog.org
Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2015 7:51:59 AM
Subject: Re: DDOS solution recommendation
On 11 Jan 2015, at 20:46, Mike Hammett wrote:
> Enough people blackhole the attacking IPs, those IPs are eventually
> going to have a very limited view of the Internet.
TCAMs have limits.
Not all networks practice anti-spoofing.
Not all networks have any visibility whatsoever into their network
traffic.
Not all networks have security teams.
Again, it would probably be advisable to do some reading before you
start telling those of us who've been working on this set of problems
for the last couple of decades that it's simple, and that we don't know
what we're doing.
-----------------------------------
Roland Dobbins <rdobbins at arbor.net>