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Chinese root CA issues rogue/fake certificates
- Subject: Chinese root CA issues rogue/fake certificates
- From: bortzmeyer at nic.fr (Stephane Bortzmeyer)
- Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 12:19:51 +0200
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
- References: <CAB69EHjh+xLBzP+XoEUpo3fRYC_33aQWCEuDZPJc8MtxdshjQg@mail.gmail.com> <CA+E3k91eiwyykLV05fVL89Fd=USe-pzuhFRx4SFaCnuYMYskKA@mail.gmail.com> <CA+E3k923N8JRguG0yfjFg6ZkfhrUxc+CcxwD0Rh9kULgrCvr-Q@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]>
On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 11:36:57AM +1000,
Matt Palmer <mpalmer at hezmatt.org> wrote
a message of 45 lines which said:
> I'd be surprised if most business continuity people could even name
> their cert provider,
And they're right because it would be a useless information: without
DANE, *any* CA can issue a certificate for *your* domain, whether you
are a client or not.