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CloudFlare issues?
- Subject: CloudFlare issues?
- From: nanog at as397444.net (Matt Corallo)
- Date: Sat, 6 Jul 2019 17:44:36 -0400
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
- References: <CAL89SgJeJdZx4HZJSuqGh9kjK27a++nSBAf8ZsADSgPG0C2wAQ@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]> <389YFhwUbb2N_1cJWv102KL5XhIbfXp-CbYLBAWB68wpqgMigmq7QHrUPAsOq_yNCQ3Yp5szlwkTA175wr8T5jUgYCz2rbZiGH1DXvRV3QQ=@plunin.net> <[email protected]> <CABC6K17oOM=_pBMOUK55TbU62CJqKSHzOiVfQuOJwJHP4y+B8g@mail.gmail.com> <CAL9Qcx7SO5LUa9cD=-NOpJC0QWO8FS9GbKrpC_W5v7jVB-JXOg@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]> <[email protected]> <CAD6AjGRwM42yEk9kWMPkNsR6t1p-JK7aOEdGdhKRMNJrregRQQ@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
On my test net I take ROA_INVALIDs and convert them to unreachables with
a low preference (ie so that any upstreams taking only the shorter path
will be selected, but so that such packets will never be routed).
Obviously this isn't a well-supported operation, but I'm curious what
people think of such an approach? If you really want to treat
ROA_INVALID as "this is probably a hijack", you don't really want to be
sending the hijacker traffic.
Of course if upstreams are rejecting ROA_INVALID you can still have the
same problem one network away, but its an interesting result for
testing, especially since it rejects a bunch of crap in China where CT
has reassigned prefixes with covering ROAs to customers who re-announce
on their own ASN (which appears to be common).
Matt
On 7/6/19 4:05 PM, Brett Frankenberger wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 04, 2019 at 11:46:05AM +0200, Mark Tinka wrote:
>> I finally thought about this after I got off my beer high :-).
>>
>> Some of our customers complained about losing access to Cloudflare's
>> resources during the Verizon debacle. Since we are doing ROV and
>> dropping Invalids, this should not have happened, given most of
>> Cloudflare's IPv4 and IPv6 routes are ROA'd.
>
> These were more-specifics, though. So if you drop all the
> more-specifics as failing ROV, then you end up following the valid
> shorter prefix to the destination. Quite possibly that points at the
> upstream which sent you the more-specific which you rejected, at which
> point your packets end up same going to the same place they would have
> gone if you had accepted the invalid more-specific.
>
> Two potential issues here: First, if you don't have an upstream who
> is also rejecting the invalid routes, then anywhere you send the
> packets, they're going to follow the more-specific. Second, even if
> you do have an upstream that is rejecting the invalid routes, ROV won't
> cause you to prefer the less-specific from an upstream that is
> rejecting the invalid routes over a less-specific from an upstream that
> is accepting the invalid routes.
>
> For example:
> if upstream A sends you:
> 10.0.0.0./16 valid
> and upstream B sends you
> 10.0.0.0/16 valid
> 10.0.0.0/17 invalid
> 10.0.128.0/17 invalid
> you want send to send the packet to A. But ROV won't cause that, and if
> upstream B is selected by your BGP decision criteria (path length,
> etc.), you're packets will ultimately follow the more-specific.
>
> (Of course, the problem is can occur more than one network away. Even
> if you do send to upstream A, there's no guarantee that A's
> less-specifics aren't pointed at another network that does have the
> more-specifics. But at least you give them a fighting chance by
> sending them to A.)
>
> -- Brett
>