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[Cryptography] Cryptography is not a science currently
- To: Ryan Carboni <[email protected]>
- Subject: [Cryptography] Cryptography is not a science currently
- From: [email protected] (coderman)
- Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 13:55:34 -0800
- Cc: cpunks <[email protected]>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]>, Crypto <[email protected]>
- In-reply-to: <CAO7N=i0yw07X7BOsbTxntJXmtK2FQCL6kVLKFE_+Wj0hc5yUkg@mail.gmail.com>
- References: <CAO7N=i0D5tO3Vd3GhYgbRAYaMmmRSSVbRpX2+2S8n2FZxZ=kdA@mail.gmail.com> <CAMm+LwgHU0eJQrCkXaLSVbZrsMsYQ4QSoUW9B7_JUoPbqZLuwA@mail.gmail.com> <CAO7N=i0yw07X7BOsbTxntJXmtK2FQCL6kVLKFE_+Wj0hc5yUkg@mail.gmail.com>
On 12/6/15, Ryan Carboni <[email protected]> wrote:
> ...
> Snowden isn't such a big deal.
some calls for preservation to the contrary:
"Why the Snowden files should be made accessible through public libraries."
- http://berlinergazette.de/snowden-files-public-library-position-paper/
"On Archiving and Commoning the Snowden Files"
- http://www.socialhistoryportal.org/news/articles/308169
> Maybe no one cares about Nicholas Merril and his fight against a national
> security letter.
did you see the unredacted version?
i actually used this recently in a FOIA, in fact:
"Per your request for fix of this request,
Under the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 §505(a), 115 Stat. 272,
365 (2001) , including recent revisions; C.f. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,
Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268, the FBI can issue National Security
Letters requesting specific business record information, including
SSL/TLS private keys used in Internet communications. See
https://peertech.org/files/merrill-v-lynch-unredacted-decision-vacating-gag.pdf
for additional information.
I am requesting Procedures, Instructions, and any other materials
regarding the proper handling of SSL/TLS secret keys obtained via
National Security Letters or Court Order under PATRIOT Act, or USA
FREEDOM Act authorities as above."
- https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/kleptokeymgmt-21208/#comm-207273
> Maybe no one cares about Mark Klein, or that Congress gave retroactive
> immunity to telecommunications providers in cooperating with the
> government.
the Mark Klein exhibits were the first time i saw sensitive private
cable tap activities exposed to the public. it was the first time i
had hope for judicial action against nation state spying activities on
domestic soil.
( i still have hope, but it is much more tempered, now :)
> Maybe no one cares that Theo de Raadt lost a DARPA grant for criticizing
> the Iraq war.
Theo an opinionated egotistical asshat, yet still no justification for
a Dixie-Chicks'in on his contracts...
> Maybe no one cares...
you're missing other significant behavior modifications,
like the "voluntary" servitude of forever-secretive classified contracts,
or compelled cooperation when they catch you ridin' dirty,
or an employer dependent on military-industrial-complex, now the
cyber-spy-n-sploit racket,
or ....
> Why am I wasting my time? There are thousands of events that transpired
> before Snowden, and Snowden is a big deal? How is he a big deal?
quantified risk. we now know with greater precision than ever before,
exactly how well resourced and bleeding edge this attacker (USA) is.
unfortunately it's almost all bad news...
( denial is not rejection; can you blame the heads in the sand, really? )
> ... The only interesting new bit of
> knowledge in 2013 was parallel construction. I had no idea that the federal
> government was */that/* crooked.
actually this was exposed in DEA investigations, but yes, the scale of
it is disturbing to say the least.
keep caring! and best regards,